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There is a growing global consensus that the secrecy-havens—jurisdictions which 
undermine global standards for corporate and financial transparency—pose a glo-
bal problem: they facilitate both money laundering and tax avoidance and evasion, 
contributing to crime and unacceptably high levels of global wealth inequality.
As economic leaders, the United States and Europe have an obligation to force 
financial centers to comply with global transparency standards. That they have the 
instruments to do so has been forcefully shown in the fight against terrorism. That 
they do not do so in the fight against corruption and tax avoidance and evasion is 
testimony to the power of the interests of those who benefit from secrecy.
In a globalized world, if there is any pocket of secrecy, funds will flow through that 
pocket. That is why the system of transparency has to be global. The US and EU are 
key in tipping the balance toward transparency, but this will only be the starting 
point: each country must play its role as a global citizen in order to shut down the 
shadow economy—and it is especially important that there emerge from the current 
secrecy havens some leaders to demonstrate that there are alternative models for 
growth and development.
Countries should position themselves proactively—not just complying with current 
minimal standards, but placing their economic development model at the cutting 
edge of the evolution of those standards. Each country must seriously consider 
whether it wants to be engaged in a never-ending struggle to catch up to the evolv-
ing international standards, or serve as a model, setting standards that others will 
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Foreword
The Panama Papers provided proof to the world of some-
thing that had long been suspected: the secrecy havens—
jurisdictions in which global financial flows were hidden 
in ways that not even those entrusted with enforcing the 
laws and regulations of countries around the world could 
detect—were being used by those engaged in a host of 
nefarious activities, from tax evasion to corruption and 
even to child pornography. In a real sense, the secrecy ha-
vens facilitate these activities, because if the money flows 
were exposed, it would be easier to identify and prose-
cute the perpetrators. Though typically the managers of 
the banks, the lawyers who put together the impenetra-
ble web of corporations and the public officials who pass 
laws ensuring secrecy may think of themselves as just 
»doing business« and helping them, their employees, and 
their country prosper, more properly these secrecy havens 
could be viewed as co-conspirators in these crimes. 
This Report begins where the Panama Papers leave off. 
While the Panama Papers describe what was going on 
behind the secrecy, this Report asks what can (and must) 
be done, both by the international community and by 
the secrecy havens. 
This Report arises from our involvement with a Commit-
tee of Independent Experts established by the President 
of the Republic of Panama in the wake of the Panama 
Papers scandal of 2016 to assess and recommend legal 
and institutional reforms to enable the country to play 
its role as a good global citizen in the fight against tax 
avoidance and evasion, corruption, and money launder-
ing while simultaneously continuing on the trajectory of 
sustainable long-term growth.
Over the past decade, Panama has established itself as 
the logistics hub of the Americas, building on the natu-
ral advantages provided by the Panama Canal and geo-
graphical location. Panama has become a diversified 
economy, with the service sector predominating along-
side healthy manufacturing and tourism industries. These 
gains have allowed Panama to cut its poverty rate by eight 
percent in the past six years through increased invest-
ments in universal public education and healthcare.1 At 
1. Between 2008 and 2014, a period including the global financial crisis, 
Panama managed to reduce poverty from 26.2 percent to 18.7 percent. 
World Bank, Panama Overview, available at http://www.worldbank.org/
en/country/panama/overview; See also Government of Panama (2014).
the same time, there have been important legal reforms, 
which in turn have contributed to Panama’s growth and 
transformation.2
In spite of such progress, Panama has had a hard time 
living down its history as a »narco-state« under Presi-
dent Noriega in the 1980s. The Panama Papers seem 
to have reinforced that image even though less than 20 
percent of the corporations were in fact Panamanian. 
History, and the fact that the trove of documents came 
from a Panamanian law firm practicing in multiple juris-
dictions, plus the name of the disclosure, undoubtedly 
chosen for the memorable alliteration, all contributed to 
put Panama at the center of attention.
The Committee of Independent Experts sought to un-
derstand what further steps the country would need to 
take to position itself as a good global citizen, enabling 
it to better fulfill its role as a logistics hub and to attract 
foreign investment. In the background were also subtle 
and not so subtle threats, ranging from cutting corre-
spondence relationships with banks in developed coun-
tries to a variety of other sanctions threatened by G20 
countries. Such sanctions could obviously deal a crip-
pling blow to the long-term growth of the Panamanian 
economy, and its efforts to develop sustainably, reduce 
poverty, and create a shared prosperity.
Some in Panama worry that if Panama were to take 
aggressive actions to curtail secrecy, it might suffer a 
competitive disadvantage, as others upon whom the 
spotlight has not shone so brightly continue their cur-
rent practices. Indeed, among the most blatant secre-
cy-havens are dependencies of and jurisdictions within 
the developed countries. Any observer of the global 
scene recognizes that the world is often unfair, there 
is a surfeit of hypocrisy, but power matters. Those de-
veloped countries that have allowed the continuation 
of such behaviors recognize the political forces at play 
2. While its banking system may not always have been a model of trans-
parency and good regulation, in recent years regulatory reforms have 
been instituted to address these deficiencies. See Executive Decree No. 
55 of 1 February 2012 (amending Executive Decree No. 1 of 3 January 
2001, regulating Law 42 of 2 October 2000). Other legislative changes in 
Panama’s legal framework have required custodianship of bearer shares 
and disclosure of beneficial ownership for newly incorporated entities. 
See Law No. 18-2015 of 23 April 2015 (amending Law 47-2013 of 6 Au-
gust 2013); Law No. 23-2015 of 27 April 2015 (requires that financial 
and legal institutions identify and record beneficial owners/beneficiaries 
of their clients; in the event that the final beneficiary is found to be a 
legal person, the law requires that identification process continue until 
a natural person is identified). Panama has also agreed to automatic ex-
change of information by 2018.
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within their own countries, which are demanding effec-
tive action to curb tax evasion and avoidance and mon-
ey laundering. Panama has to deal with these aspects 
of Realpolitik.
We had hoped that our recommendations would be part 
of a report outlining reforms for Panama that would not 
come at significant cost to the country, but instead poise 
Panama to become a role model for others. However, 
that was not to be. We had demanded at the beginning 
of our deliberations that our Report be made public, 
whatever its findings, after giving the government suit-
able time for formulating a response. We had left it to 
the government to decide on how much time they felt 
was necessary. When the government refused to pro-
vide those assurances, we felt we had no choice but to 
resign. We believed that a report on transparency that 
was not itself transparent would simply not be credible. 
We had to lead by example.3 
Yet the challenge posed to the Committee—that of 
determining what is required to end secrecy-havens, 
which have played such a large role in facilitating tax 
avoidance and evasion, corruption, narco-trafficking, 
and other socially repugnant activities by providing a 
safe haven for the funds garnered by such illicit activ-
ities—remains as important today as at the time our 
Committee began its work. In recent years, globaliza-
tion has been subject to controversy and criticism with 
its advocates explaining its benefits and its critics em-
phasizing its costs. There are, of course, many aspects 
of globalization. But there is one aspect on which there 
is a broad agreement: secrecy-havens have no place in 
a world of positive globalization. They, like the move-
ment of terrorists across borders, are among the darker 
sides of globalization.
 
Given the investment of thought and time to this en-
deavor—of developing an agenda for combating secre-
cy-havens—we thought it desirable to move forward 
constructively by issuing this Report. What we seek is 
to address this global and systemic problem by making 
recommendations applicable to all countries for over-
coming the shadow economy and ultimately, shutting 
it down. 
This Report is written in that spirit.
3. For more information on our involvement, see Stigliz and Pieth (2016).
I. Introduction
There is a growing global consensus that the secrecy-ha-
vens—jurisdictions which undermine global standards 
for corporate and financial transparency—pose a global 
problem: they facilitate both money laundering4 and tax 
avoidance and evasion5, contributing to crime and unac-
ceptably high levels of global wealth inequality. Over the 
years, the global problems posed by secrecy and lack of 
transparency have increased, and, not surprisingly, this 
growth has been accompanied by growth in attempts to 
curb it and the resulting abuses of the global corporate 
and financial system. Citizens are asking, why do offshore 
financial centers exist at all? Americans want to know, 
why did one of their presidential candidates in 2012 keep 
his money in an offshore center? Wasn’t there sufficient 
competency in the United States to manage his wealth? 
Or were there some tax or other benefits—available to the 
rich, who could avail themselves of these offshore centers, 
but not to others. It is not as if there is something special in 
the sunshine of the Cayman Islands or the other offshore 
centers that makes money grow faster than elsewhere. If 
anything, it is the lack of sunshine that is the problem.
If there is something wrong with America’s or Europe’s 
regulatory regime that requires certain transactions to 
occur elsewhere, this deficiency should be cured. But if 
what is going on is simply fiscal and regulatory circum-
vention, shouldn’t the offshore centers simply either be 
shut down or forced to comply with and assist in the 
enforcement of national and international tax and reg-
ulatory standards? The disclosures by the International 
Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) of massive 
tax avoidance and other »irregular« activities in onshore 
and offshore financial centers have only heightened 
public perception that these secrecy-havens are up to no 
good—and stepped up pressure to do something.
This raises a whole series of questions, for the interna-
tional community and for any country wishing to remain 
an active financial center within that community: What 
can be done about secrecy and the lack of transparency? 
What diverse forms does secrecy take? What would a 
4. »Money laundering is the processing of (...) criminal proceeds to dis-
guise their illegal origin.« See Glossary of FATF Recommendations, avail-
able at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/faq/moneylaundering.
5. Tax evasion is defined as reducing tax payable by fraudulent (i.e. illegal) 
means while tax avoidance is defined as lawful tax liability minimization. 
(Black’s Law Dictionary, 2nd ed., 2001).
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globally efficient system of global information transmis-
sion and collection look like and what can countries do 
to avoid complicity with bad actors of the shadow econ-
omy? In other words, what does good global citizenship 
in information look like?
Over the past forty years, the world has come to a better 
understanding of the consequences of lack of transpar-
ency. In economics, a whole branch of the field has de-
veloped with multiple awards of Nobel Prizes for enhanc-
ing our understanding of the consequences of imperfect 
information. The standard theorems about the efficiency 
of the market were developed under the assumption of 
full information; with imperfect information—in particu-
lar, with one person having information that others do 
not, which is what is meant by secrecy and lack of trans-
parency—the economy is not in general efficient.6 One 
party can and often does take advantage of another. 
That is why all countries have fraud and disclosure laws 
on consumer product contents, securities, etc., with stiff 
penalties to ensure that the disclosures are truthful.
Similarly, in politics and government there has been an 
increasing awareness of the dangers of secrecy. Such se-
crecy is the basis of most corruption and as the saying 
goes, »sunshine is the strongest anti-septic.« With trans-
parency, the special arrangements that lead to a govern-
ment receiving less than it should for assets or paying 
more for what it procures would not occur.7
There are markedly different attitudes towards secrecy 
and transparency around the world. In Norway, Sweden 
and Finland, tax returns are regularly published online. 
Their attitude is: What do people have to hide? If they 
earn their income honestly, why shouldn’t they disclose 
it? At the other end of the spectrum are countries, such as 
the Philippines, which view disclosure as an invasion of pri-
vacy, punishing those who disclose taxpayer information.8 
6. This result, overturning Adam Smith’s »invisible hand theorem«, was 
established by Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986).
7. Sometimes, secrecy is used not just for these kinds of nefarious pecu-
niary activities, but simply to advance political perspectives. Daniel Moy-
nihan, one of America’s most influential senators, wrote a powerful book 
describing the consequences of secrecy, entitled simply Secrecy. He argued 
that it had had the effect of extending and intensifying the Cold War. See 
Moynihan (1998). There is now a huge literature on the subject. See, e. g., 
Stiglitz (2001); Stiglitz (2002); Florini (2007).
8. See Republic Act No. 8424 of 11 December 1997 (prohibits disclosure 
of tax records with a penalty of PHP50,000–PHP100,000 and two to five 
years imprisonment for Bureau of the Internal Revenue (BIR) employees 
and PHP2,000 and six months to five years for individuals who cause a 
disclosure).
If there were not social consequences to decisions con-
cerning transparency and privacy, one could leave it to 
each individual to decide how much and what to dis-
close. But there are huge social consequences. Most 
socially destructive activities—activities that undermine 
the very functioning of society—occur behind the cloak 
of secrecy. If ill-gotten gains from crime and especial-
ly corruption can be traced and monitored, then the 
likelihood of apprehending those who engage in these 
activities is increased. This in turn markedly reduces in-
centives to engage in these socially destructive activities.
Secrecy also undermines the ability to ensure that every-
one is making their contribution. If ours were still a sim-
ple agrarian society, with each farmer growing their own 
food and making their own clothes, one might well ar-
gue that there is little need for a state, and thus little cost 
to the nondisclosure of income information. In an earlier 
era, much of government spending went to the waging 
of wars. But in a modern, complex society, we have to 
raise large amounts of money to make our society func-
tion, to promote growth and to ensure that the fruits of 
that growth are equitably shared. We need, for instance, 
investments in infrastructure, education, healthcare, ba-
sic research, and a host of other common needs. If soci-
ety is to function well, everyone has to contribute their 
fair share. But some individuals would like to freeride, to 
take advantage of the provision of public goods without 
paying. If that is allowed to occur, the whole social con-
tract can break down. 
Globalization has resulted in a global economy, but not 
a global government. If we had a global government, 
almost surely, it would enact strong global legislation re-
quiring banks and other financial operators in all coun-
tries to conform to certain transparency standards. It 
would realize the corrosive effect of secrecy, and would 
do what it could to combat it. In the absence of such 
a global government, the major players can effectively 
force others to comply with their standards, simply by 
threatening to cut off access to their financial system. 
And in fact, many in the United States have been calling 
for the government to break off all connections with ju-
risdictions not conforming to the global standards (even 
secrecy jurisdictions within their own territories), effec-
tively shutting down all secrecy-havens. There is a widely 
shared perspective that these havens only exist because 
the United States and Europe have looked the other 
way—influenced by their own one percent. These major 
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players have yet to pull the trigger, partly due to the de-
lay in putting their own houses in order. But in societies 
with growing inequality, this is increasingly viewed as in-
tolerable. Thus, there is a real possibility that, over time, 
they will be shut down: current initiatives are but the 
first step in a far more aggressive encounter.
In a globalized world, if there is any pocket of secrecy, 
funds will flow through that pocket. That is why the 
system of transparency has to be global. The US and EU 
are key in tipping the balance toward transparency, but 
this will only be the starting point: each country must 
play its role as a global citizen in order to shut down the 
shadow economy—and it is especially important that 
there emerge from the current secrecy havens some 
leaders to demonstrate that there are alternative models 
for growth and development.
This Report attempts to address these aspects of secre-
cy and provide recommendations for overcoming the 
shadow economy and ultimately, closing it down. Sec-
tion II explores the global phenomenon of secrecy-ha-
vens, the structures through which illicit funds escape 
detection, and the risks involved in that opacity. Sec-
tion III describes the ongoing international efforts and 
emerging standards to reign in the shadow economy. In 
Section IV, we offer recommendations for all countries 
for closing the global channels of secrecy, and Section V 
concludes with a perspective on why such measures are 
necessary for the survival of globalization.
II. Secrecy, Tax preferences, 
and the Race to the Bottom
The Panama Papers and other information leaks,9 which 
will no doubt continue, have demonstrated the risks of 
playing an enabling role in obscuring financial flows. 
Some of these flows may have a perfectly legal back-
ground, but many of them do not. The Panama Papers 
revealed that the law firms in question10—operating on 
9. Swiss Leaks, Luxembourg Leaks, and now, the Bahamas Leaks detail 
widespread use of tax and secrecy jurisdiction. See https://www.icij.org/
projects for full descriptions.
10. Mossack Fonseca began operating more than 40 years ago in the late 
1970s, in what has been described as the golden age of offshore compa-
nies. It is popularly known in Panama as the law firm that began the off-
shore accounts services. The firm started out by setting up companies in 
Panama, taking advantage of its particularly lax corporate laws. However, 
after the United States invaded Panama (making investors nervous), Mos-
sack Fonseca shifted its main operations to the British Virgin Islands. BVI 
a worldwide basis, including in other offshore centers as 
well as large traditional financial centers—opened and 
serviced shell companies, trusts, private foundations, 
and other entities to serve as integral components of so-
called »structures« through which money flows. These 
complex constructions are composed of companies 
with unknown owners and beneficiaries (hidden behind 
nominee directors and bearer shares11) with multiple 
bank accounts in jurisdictions with strong bank secrecy 
legislation and little likelihood of cooperation with for-
eign authorities. The structures are organized by fiduci-
aries, mostly lawyers, who are typically under-regulated, 
and who use their attorney-client privilege to mask the 
identity of their clients. 
Even if there could be some legitimate uses of certain 
features offered by tax havens,12 the Panama Papers 
have shed light on a number of egregious abuses en-
abled by these structures: apart from straightforward 
tax fraud by private persons and companies, another 
group of cases indicates that officials, ministers, and 
even heads of state used these structures to cover up 
conflicts of interest or even graft, corruption, and em-
bezzlement. A third group of cases exposed the use of 
these structures in laundering proceeds from organized 
crime. In a particularly disturbing case, one client of the 
Panamanian law firm was the alleged ringleader of a 
child prostitution ring in Russia, whose members kid-
napped, raped, and sold orphan girls. The ICIJ reported 
that when the firm discovered accusations of its client’s 
involvement, it determined that it was not legally obli-
gated to report them.13 Thus, these structures have ena-
bled and in fact incentivized such heinous abuses of the 
most vulnerable.
At the same time, these structures are developed and 
used by respected global corporations to avoid taxation 
soon became its biggest jurisdiction of operation. BVI also had the added 
advantage of a legal system answerable to British courts, offering a great 
deal of security to investors. In the following years, the firm flourished, 
and established several international branches making it the fourth larg-
est provider of offshore services in the world. As its operations expanded, 
so did its reputation, which in turn brought in further business. See Luke 
Harding, »Mossack Fonseca: inside the firm that helps the super-rich hide 
their money,« Guardian, 08 April 2016 (accessed 12 Oct. 2016).
11. Bearer shares are negotiable instruments that accord ownership in 
a legal entity to the person who holds the bearer share certificate. See 
Glossary of FATF Recommendations, available at http://www.fatf-gafi.
org/glossary/a-c/.
12. See Christine Capilouto, Research note, »A more nuanced argument 
for tax havens«, 1 Oct., 2016 (on file with the authors).
13. See Obermayer and Obermaier (2016).
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on massive wealth, in the trillions of dollars.14 With the 
assistance of legal and accounting firms (and some-
times governments, which have provided secret tax 
rulings authorizing such structures, as revealed by the 
Luxembourg Leaks, informally referred to as LuxLeaks), 
multinational corporations shift earnings from the place 
of economic activity to low- or zero-tax jurisdictions 
through transfer pricing manipulations and other con-
trived outbound payments, thereby leaving the place of 
economic activity to carry the social cost. 
In addition, governments often complement use of 
these structures by providing tax-free special econom-
ic zones and preferential tax treatment for incorporated 
entities, which are subject to little or no tax reporting 
requirements so long as they do not engage in the do-
mestic economy. The most troubling aspect though, is 
that all of this is perfectly legal. Yet, without a doubt, 
such preferential tax treatment is highly problematic as 
it circumvents enforcement of tax laws by third countries 
and undermines the social state in the North, develop-
ment in the South, and investments in infrastructure, 
technology, education, and thus, growth everywhere.
What, if any, are the social benefits of these complex 
and opaque arrangements? It is increasingly apparent 
that there are huge social costs. From a global perspec-
tive, this form of competition is destructive. From a tax 
perspective, such structures do not result in more eco-
nomic activity, but simply the movement of activity from 
one location to another—or in some cases, just the ap-
pearance of the movement of activity from one location 
to another. Indeed, tax competition leads to higher in-
equality and poorer public services. Even more troubling 
is its connection to secrecy: A traditional part of money 
laundering is shifting illicit profits to secrecy-havens not 
only to conceal their origins, but also to avoid taxation.
Yet, some countries continue to perceive their competi-
tive advantage as arising partly from low taxation and 
minimal regulation. The theory is that even if a country 
does not directly receive fiscal revenues from a business 
that is persuaded to incorporate there, the economic ac-
tivity that is generated is of benefit, and some of that 
will be taxed indirectly. More often than not, howev-
er, the costs overwhelmingly outweigh the benefits by 
14. Tax Justice Network estimates this amount at 21–32 trillion US dol-
lars. See Henry (2012). 
hampering domestic innovation and creating an elite 
class within the country to guard the interests of those 
benefiting from the secrecy-havens and any foreign in-
vestment that it might generate. 
It is important to recognize that the greater the tax pref-
erences, the greater the attraction for money launder-
ing. Therefore, if a country does choose to provide un-
due tax preferences, fuller transparency, strengthened 
monitoring, and consistent enforcement are required. 
If a country chooses to maintain tax preferences, it will 
have to open all of the books of those taking advantage 
of the tax preferences to inspection by anyone in the 
international community, subjecting them to heightened 
scrutiny, generating more demands for strong enforce-
ment, and placing the country at greater risk of inter-
national censure when enforcement proves inadequate. 
These costs need to be taken into account as a country 
weighs the benefits and costs of the continuation of 
such preferential treatment.
But whether a country provides such tax preferences or 
not, important questions regarding opaque structures in 
offshore financial centers should be raised: Why is the cor-
poration / trust  / foundation incorporated in an offshore 
financial center? What are the benefits that it receives 
that it would not have if it were incorporated in one of 
the countries where its economic activities occur? The 
response of the international community to the growing 
legitimate concerns about the costs of secrecy is to de-
mand greater transparency all round—of the finance and 
corporate sectors, of opaque trusts and foundations, and 
of those who serve them. Below, we spell out more pre-
cisely what transparency entails for entities (companies, 
trusts, foundations, etc.) incorporated in any jurisdiction: 
the identity of the beneficial owners, the location of their 
economic activities, as well as the amounts of global prof-
its and taxes due and paid in each country. The interna-
tional community’s efforts to develop standards which 
address these concerns are outlined in the next section.
III. International Standards on  
Financial and Tax Transparency
Since 2009, in the face of the financial crisis and emp-
ty public purses, the global fight against tax avoidance, 
evasion, and financial opacity has gained new ground. 
Increasingly, the structures of the global financial sys-
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tem are perceived to facilitate so-called illicit financial 
flows (commonly defined as »money illegally earned, 
transferred, or used that crosses borders«).15 These 
flows undermine the rule of law, exacerbate inequality 
and have a detrimental impact, especially on developing 
countries, where severe deprivation suffered by the very 
poor continues to infringe on their human rights (social 
and economic as well as civil and political rights).16 
We live in an age when the economic, technological, 
and administrative capacities are in place to effectively 
tackle extreme poverty. What is needed, however, are 
reforms in the global system of secrecy-havens to avoid 
the draining of state budgets, especially of developing 
countries.17 At the same time, even developed countries 
have become aware of the massive amounts of offshore 
wealth and aggressive tax avoidance that strips public 
budgets; the corrosive effect that such leakages have on 
voluntary tax compliance; and the effect that they have 
on growing inequality, increasingly identified as one of 
the world’s most important problems. Moreover, corrup-
tion and other illicit activities that are facilitated by secre-
cy-havens undermine the very fiber of all societies. In the 
face of overwhelming democratic demands to address 
these problems, global coordination has been stepped 
up to increase both financial and tax transparency.
1) Financial Transparency
The fall of the Berlin Wall and the opening of the East in-
tensified economic globalization, with both positive and 
negative consequences. International regulation in the 
areas of anti–money laundering, anti-corruption, and 
countering the financing of terrorism emerged nearly 
concurrently. The international community has adopted 
a sequence of flagship conventions in the area of eco-
nomic and organized crime, starting with the Vienna 
Convention on Illicit Trafficking in Drugs of 1988; going 
on to the United Nations Convention on Transnational 
Organized Crime (2000) including its additional protocol 
on human trafficking; the OECD Convention on Bribery 
of Foreign Public Officials (1997); the United Nations 
Convention on Anti-Corruption (UNCAC, 2003), and 
15. See World Bank, Illicit Financial Flows, available at http://www.world-
bank.org/en/topic/financialmarketintegrity/brief/illicit-financial-flows-iffs.
16. See Sepúlveda (2014).
17. See Pogge and Mehta (2016).
several more specific agreements on corruption, money 
laundering, and the financing of terrorism. The common 
denominator of these international agreements is the 
prevention of the abuse of the financial sector for illicit 
purposes. 
Overall, international standards on anti–money launder-
ing and anti-corruption are a combination of »hard« and 
»soft« law, bolstered by tough, politically engaged mon-
itoring mechanisms, refined by business associations 
and multi-stakeholder groups, and finally translated into 
in-house regulation. This mix of standards is applied by 
prosecutors and courts when defining corporate liability 
for money laundering and corruption.18 Overall, this type 
of »co-regulation« system (which initially originated in 
the human rights area) has been effective in a variety 
of areas, such as anti–money laundering, combating the 
financing of terrorism, and anti-corruption. 
The identification of beneficial ownership has become a 
key transparency requirement. Unlike the nominal owner, 
the beneficial owner is the natural person who actually 
enjoys the use and title of the property—without actually 
having to be named as the legal owner.19 At first sight 
it may seem obvious to demand—on a worldwide ba-
sis—meaningful public registers of companies identify-
ing their beneficial owners. Indeed, the United Kingdom 
and France have established public registries of company 
owners.20 Currently, however, the primary obligation of 
identification of beneficial ownership is placed on finan-
cial operators, such as banks, with the obligation to re-
port to regulatory authorities.21 We expand on this sub-
ject below in Section IV.
18. See Pieth (2007); Pieth (2008a); Pieth (2008b).
19. Beneficial owner of an asset or corporate entity refers to the natural 
person(s) who ultimately owns or controls the asset or corporate entity 
and/or the natural person on whose behalf a transaction is conducted. 
It thus includes those who exercise ultimate effective control over an 
entity or arrangement. See Glossary of FATF Recommendations, available 
at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/glossary/a-c/.
20. As of 6 April 2016 all United Kingdom companies have been required 
to identify and record their owners/controllers. See Part 21A, Compa-
nies Act 2006. The UK has also committed to implement a publicly ac-
cessible central register of beneficial owners or »people with significant 
control«. See Small Business, Enterprise, and Employment Bill, clause 70 
and Schedule 3. On 22 July 2016, France instituted public registries of 
company owners and beneficiaries of trusts and foundations, but has 
now closed the trust registries after the Constitutional Council ruled that 
such registries result in a »disproportionate interference with the right to 
privacy.« Décision n° 2016-591 QPC du 21 Octobre 2016.
21. On 11 July 2016, the United States adopted a Treasury rule (called 
FinCEN) requiring financial operators to report (to government authori-
ties only) and verify (through documentation only) the beneficial owner(s) 
of legal entity customers by 11 May 2018. See 81 F.R. 29397.
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a) Anti–Money Laundering (AML)
The topic of money laundering emerged on the interna-
tional level with the Vienna Convention of 1988, as part 
of the arsenal against illicit trafficking in drugs.22 The 
next year the G7 called a meeting under the auspices of 
the Financial Action Task Force (Groupe d’action finan-
cière or FATF23), then led by the French President Mitter-
rand and his Minister of Finance. From the »Sommet de 
l’Arche«, the FATF developed its 40 Recommendations 
to combat money laundering. In a first phase they ad-
dressed on the one hand criminalization of drug-related 
money laundering, confiscation of ill-gotten gains, and 
the relevant mutual legal and administrative assistance; 
and on the other hand, the six classic requirements of 
financial supervision: (1) identification of clients and ben-
eficial owners, (2) increased diligence in unusual transac-
tions, (3) notification of suspicious transactions, (4) rel-
evant documentation, (5) introduction of a compliance 
function by financial intermediaries, and (6) reporting of 
large cash transactions.24 
The centerpiece of the FATF AML (anti-money launder-
ing) system is identification and verification of the iden-
tity of beneficial owners (including corporations, foun-
dations, and trusts).25 Civil society observers, however, 
are concerned that the standards are not sufficiently 
high. For instance, they have criticized the high thresh-
old of 25 percent ownership in FATF’s beneficial own-
ership definition (that is, an individual with less than a 
25 percent interest does not have to be identified). They 
also see the provision allowing senior managers to be 
listed as the beneficial owner where no other person 
is identified as another »loophole« in the AML system. 
Instead, they propose that a beneficial owner should be 
any (»natural«) person with at least one share. In the 
case of trusts, the identified »beneficial owners« should 
include any person mentioned in trust documents.26
Closely related is determination of the origin of the 
funds, in particular where transactions and patterns of 
client behavior do not immediately make sense from a 
22. United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances (1988).
23. As will be clear as this report proceeds, work in this area is very acro-
nym intensive. We have identified each acronym the first time it is used. 
24. See FATF Recommendations (1990).
25. See FATF Recommendations (2012) 10, 12, 24, and 25.
26. See Knobel and Meinzer (2016a); Knobel and Meinzer (2016b).
professional point of view (the so-called »risk based ap-
proach«).27
The FATF has continued to enlarge the scope of its work 
in three directions: going beyond funds stemming from 
illegal drug trafficking to all serious predicate28 crimes; 
including all financial operators in addition to banks; and 
expanding geographically to include all relevant financial 
centers. While FATF standards continue to be based on 
soft law, they are enforced through country peer-reviews 
and monitoring and, if necessary, trade sanctions against 
so-called non-cooperative countries and territories.29
From 1990 on, regional bodies, such as the Council of 
Europe30 and the European Union31 translated the Rec-
ommendations into traditional international agreements 
and the standards have concurrently been implemented 
in national law and regulation, making them also legally 
binding for the financial industry. The financial industry, 
banks in particular, followed these developments closely 
and helped shape the agenda through collective actions, 
such as the Wolfsberg Group, which developed in-house 
compliance rules addressing money laundering and cor-
ruption risks and incorporating international standards 
and national laws.32
b) Countering the Financing of Terrorism
From the 1970s the United Nations drafted various in-
struments to combat and prevent terrorism. Typically 
these instruments—triggered by terrorist activities in 
27. See supra note 24, Recommendations 1 and 10.
28. A predicate offence is an action that provides resources for another 
criminal act, for example, tax evasion, illegal logging, trading in contraband, 
human trafficking, etc. The UN Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime (2000) in Article 2(h) defines predicate crime as follows: »›Predicate 
offence‹ shall mean any offence as a result of which proceeds have been 
generated that may become the subject of an offence as defined in article 
6 of this Convention«. Article 6 regulates money laundering and seeks to 
apply to the widest range of predicate offences, including corruption.
29. See FATF (2000).
30. Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure, and 
Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime (ETS No. 141).
31. First EU Money Laundering Directive of 1991 (91/308/EEC); Second 
EU Money Laundering Directive of 2001 (2001/97/EC); Third EU Money 
Laundering Directive of 2005 (2005/60/EC).
32. The Wolfsberg Group, eleven of the largest international private 
banks, started its work by developing general anti–money laundering 
standards for private banks and went on to adopt an entire series of 
specialized documents (on the prevention of terrorism, on the risk-based 
approach, on correspondent banking, and on anti-corruption). Cf. Pieth 
and Aiolfi (2003); Pieth (2007); Wolfsberg (2000/2002/2012); Wolfsberg 
(2002a); Wolfsberg (2002b); Wolfsberg (2006).
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Germany (Rote Armee Fraktion) and Italy (Brigate Rosse) 
and the terrorist activities of Palestinian organizations—
were focused on specific forms of threat (e. g. against 
aviation, oil platforms etc.).33 In 1999, the United Na-
tions added a convention on the financing of terror-
ism.34 Shortly afterwards, following 9/11, the inter-
national community led by the United States declared 
all-out »war on terror«, including its financing. Follow-
ing earlier models of combating drugs and other serious 
crime, the international community introduced serious 
restrictions to prevent the use of the financial system for 
the preparation and financing of terrorist acts. It used 
the agreements it had developed to combat money 
laundering and extended the list of predicate offences 
to money laundering to include the »financing of terror-
ism«. In addition, the United Nations Security Council 
developed so-called »smart sanctions«, which target 
the free movement of capital of suspicious persons.35
c) Anti-Corruption
The development of international anti-corruption stand-
ards has followed a very similar pattern: in 1977, after 
the Watergate scandal, the United States Congress 
adopted—initially unilaterally—a foreign bribery stat-
ute, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).36 After the 
main competitors signaled their unwillingness to follow 
suit, the legislation was amended in 1988.37 Post-1990, 
the United States has worked to internationalize the 
FCPA through the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development (OECD). 
From 1990 to 1997, the OECD developed two Recom-
mendations and a Convention addressing preventive 
33. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft of 
16 December 1970; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
Against the Safety of Civil Aviation of 23 September 1971; Protocol for 
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving Interna-
tional Civil Aviation, Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppres-
sion of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft 1970 of 24 February 1988; Conven-
tion for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation of 10 March 1988 and its Protocol for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Con-
tinental Shelf of 10 March 1988; International Convention against the 
Taking of Hostages of 17 December 1997; International Convention for 
the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings of 15 December 1997.
34. UN International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism (1999).
35. UNSC Res. 1267, 1373; Pieth and Eymann (2009).
36. US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Public Law No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494.
37. US Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act, Public Law No. 100-418, 
102 Stat. 1107.
and punitive measures against foreign bribery.38 Again 
the combination of recommendations and hard law was 
enforced vis-à-vis member states largely with a political 
rather than a legal tool: country monitoring.39 Further-
more, the OECD continued regulation with a mix of its 
Convention and an updated Recommendation of 2009 
as well as even softer forms of guidance notes.40 On a 
member state level, the international standard as devel-
oped by the OECD was again translated into national 
law and regulation.41 Concurrently, other international 
organizations, like the Organization of American States, 
the Council of Europe, the European Union, and the Or-
ganization of African Unity—for diverging reasons of 
their own—picked up the issue of corruption and draft-
ed their own legal instruments.42 
Over time, the rationale of the anti-corruption move-
ment gradually expanded from safeguarding fair com-
petition to a development and good governance agen-
da. In more recent times the anti-corruption and human 
rights instruments moved closer together. The UNCAC 
picked up all these elements and developed them into a 
comprehensive approach, which included replicating the 
foreign bribery part of the OECD instruments. Country 
peer-reviews and monitoring were gradually adopted as 
a means of ensuring implementation by all international 
organizations.
Concurrent to the emergence of international instru-
ments the multilateral development banks decided that 
38. Recommendation of the Council of the OECD on Bribery in Interna-
tional Business Transactions (adopted by the Council on 27 May 1994); 
Revised Recommendation of the Council of the OECD on Combating 
Bribery in International Business Transactions (adopted by the Council on 
23 May 1997); OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Pub-
lic Officials in International Business Transactions (adopted 21 November 
1997, signed 17 December 1997).
39. See Bonucci (2014).
40. Recommendation of the Council of the OECD for Further Combating 
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions 
(adopted by the Council on 26 November 2009); Annex I: Good Practice 
Guidance on Implementing Specific Articles of the Convention on Com-
bating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Trans-
actions; Annex II: Good Practice Guidance on Internal Controls, Ethics, 
and Compliance (adopted 18 February 2010).
41. See e. g., UK Bribery Act 2010 c. 23.
42. Inter-American Convention against Corruption, 29 March 1996; 
Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, ETS No. 173; 
in European Union, the Protocol drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of 
the Treaty on European Union to the Convention on the protection of the 
European Communities’ financial interests (OJ C 313, 23.10.1996, pp. 
1–10), and the Convention drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 (2) (c) of 
the Treaty on European Union on the fight against corruption involving 
officials of the European Communities or officials of Member States of 
the European Union (OJ C 195, 25.6.1997, pp. 1–11; African Union Con-
vention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, 11 July 2003.
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combating corruption was within their fiduciary duties, 
partially in response to mounting evidence of adverse 
effects of corruption on development.43 They main-
streamed the anti-corruption policies in their operations 
and introduced sanctions against companies and indi-
viduals engaging in fraudulent and corrupt behavior.44 
Business organizations45 and NGOs46 also picked up the 
emerging standards and the so-called »compliance in-
dustry« increasingly consolidated the rules. Again, busi-
ness organizations in the financial sector, most prom-
inently Wolfsberg, drafted anti-corruption guidance,47 
which was adopted by member banks and translated 
into in-house standards. Finally, domestic court deci-
sions and settlements (especially in the United States 
and Germany) integrated the overall standards for de-
fining corporate liability.48 Ultimately, countries intro-
duced the common standard in official guidelines and 
guidance notes.49
2) Tax Transparency
a) Information Exchange on Tax Matters
By now, there is a global consensus that greater tax 
cooperation between countries is needed, including 
an effective exchange of information between tax ad-
ministrations. Historically, exchange of information for 
tax purposes took place through bilateral tax treaties 
based on the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income 
43. The World Bank’s charter prevents engagement in political activities, 
and earlier, criticism of governments for corruption had been viewed 
as political. Supported by results from its research department, under 
Chief Economist Joseph Stiglitz, the World Bank under President James 
Wolfensohn began a major anti-corruption campaign, which included 
identifying corruption-resistant institutional structures and policies.
44. See the World Bank Sanctions Procedures, 15 April 2012; the Sanc-
tions Procedures of the Inter-American Development Bank, 9 June 2015; 
the Document of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment, Enforcement Policy and Procedures, 25 April 2014; and the Sanc-
tions Procedures of the African Development Bank Group, 18 November 
2014.
45. International Chamber of Commerce, Rules of Conduct to Combat 
Extortion and Bribery.
46. Transparency International Business Principles for Countering Bribery.
47. Wolfsberg (2007); Wolfsberg (2011).
48. This means that companies have to define their particular risk pro-
file and develop and implement tailor-made compliance systems to keep 
out of trouble. M. Pieth and R. Ivory (2011), Corporate Criminal Liability, 
Emergence, Convergence, and Risk, Dordrecht et al., 50 et seq., 393 et 
seq.
49. A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 14 No-
vember 2012; UK Bribery Act 2010, Guidance about procedures which 
relevant commercial organisations can put into place to prevent persons 
associated with them from bribing (section 9 of the Bribery Act 2010).
and on Capital or the United Nations Model Convention 
on Double Taxation Between Developed and Develop-
ing Countries. Both the OECD and UN models serve as 
refe rence documents when countries draw up bilater-
al tax conventions, enabling them to settle the most 
common problems on a uniform basis. Article 26 un-
der both models provides for exchange of information 
by the competent authorities of the contracting states. 
Paragraph 1 of Article 26 allows information to be ex-
changed in three different ways (individually or in com-
bination): on request, automatically, or spontaneously.50
However, information exchange under bilateral tax trea-
ties has not been adequate to stem the leakages from 
aggressive tax avoidance, which the OECD now esti-
mates to be between 100 and 240 billion US dollars 
annually.51 Multinational tax avoidance alone results in 
revenues losses in the hundreds of billions of dollars, 
and has been the subject of extensive public discussion 
since the uncovering of the secret agreements between 
Ireland and Apple (and remarkably, in this era of trans-
parency, as this Report goes to press, the two continue 
to refuse to allow the public disclosure of the European 
Commission ruling against them).52 Two decades ago, 
such leakages were increasingly apparent to world lead-
ers, who through the G7 requested the OECD to address 
this leakage through a report, entitled Harmful Tax Com-
petition (1998). This report began the effort to define 
»harmful tax practices« and then apply these standards 
to preferential tax regimes through a Forum on Harmful 
Tax Practices (FHTP), housed within the OECD. Secondly, 
the agenda to improve exchange of tax-related infor-
mation was taken on through a Global Forum on Tax, 
later renamed the Global Forum on Transparency and 
Exchange of Information (Global Forum). The Harmful 
Tax Competition report outlined a work agenda to iden-
tify preferential tax treatment among OECD countries 
and created a »blacklist« of tax havens. The report also 
established criteria for preferential tax laws which were 
potentially harmful and the FHTP carried the recommen-
dations of the report forward. 
50. In detail: OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, 15 
July 2014, Commentary on Article 26, C(26)-9 et seq.
51. http://www.oecd.org/ctp/policy-brief-beps-2015.pdf.
52. The European Commission website states: »The public version of this 
decision [SA38373] is not yet available. It will be displayed as soon as it 
has been cleansed of any confidential information.« http://ec.europa.eu/
competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm?fuseaction=dsp_result&policy_area_
id=3&case_number=38373. For a broader discussion of tax avoidance 
by multinationals, see the Independent Commission for the Reform of 
International Corporate Taxation (2015).
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By 2000, the FHTP had identified 47 potentially harmful 
regimes within OECD countries as well as 35 tax haven 
jurisdictions, but within six years, all but one were tak-
en off and the Global Forum took over the black-listing 
work. Following the 2009 London Summit of the G20, 
at which G20 Leaders pledged »to take action against 
non-cooperative jurisdictions, including tax havens«53 
the Global Forum was re-structured with an independ-
ent secretariat to monitor the implementation of stand-
ards on tax transparency and exchange of information 
through peer-review mechanisms, country reports, and 
compliance ratings. The FHTP remained within the OECD 
and was restricted to address only preferential tax laws 
and development defensive measures against them.54 
Around the same time, in 2010, the United States enact-
ed the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA)55 on 
a unilateral basis. Under FATCA, foreign financial institu-
tions are obliged to report basic information (name, ad-
dress, taxpayer identification number, etc.) on accounts 
held by U.S. taxpayers or by foreign entities owned by 
U.S. taxpayers to the U.S. Internal Revenue Service, oth-
erwise, account holders are subject to a 30 percent with-
holding tax penalty (imposed by the foreign financial in-
stitutions as stipulated by the FATCA country agreements) 
on all payments from these foreign accounts.56 As of this 
writing 113 countries have entered into bilateral intergov-
ernmental agreements with the U.S. under FATCA; some 
provide for reciprocal reporting and some do not.
Although the Convention on Mutual Administrative As-
sistance in Tax Matters (CMAATM) was first developed 
by the OECD and Council of Europe in 1988, at the 
request of the G20, the Convention was amended by 
Protocol in 2011 to allow for participation by all coun-
tries. Two years later, the G20 mandated the OECD to 
53. G20 (2009).
54. OECD (2015).
55. Public Law No. 111-147, 124 Stat.71.
56. Under FATCA agreements, a »participating« FFI has to: »(1) under-
take certain identification and due diligence procedures with respect to 
its accountholders; (2) report annually to the IRS on its accountholders 
who are U.S. persons or foreign entities with substantial U.S. ownership; 
and (3) withhold and pay over to the IRS 30-percent of any payments of 
U.S. source income, as well as gross proceeds from the sale of securities 
that generate U.S. source income, made to (a) non-participating FFIs, 
(b) individual account holders failing to provide sufficient information to 
determine whether or not they are a U.S. person, or (c) foreign entity 
accountholders failing to provide sufficient information about the iden-
tity of its substantial U.S. owners.« IRS, Summary of Key FATCA Provi-
sions, available at https://www.irs.gov/businesses/corporations/summa-
ry-of-key-fatca-provisions.
develop a so-called common reporting standard (CRS) 
for the automatic exchange of tax information, called 
the Common Standard on Reporting and Due Diligence 
for Financial Account Information and by 2015, the 
OECD published the CRS Implementation Handbook.57 
Although over 85 countries have signed the Multilateral 
Competent Authority Agreement implementing the CRS 
(MCAA), the United States has not.58
Under the CRS, each reporting financial institution (de-
fined as custodial institutions,59 depository institutions,60 
investment entities,61 and specified insurance companies62) 
should provide the following account information:63
n  in the case of individuals as account holders: name, 
address, jurisdiction(s) of residence, Taxpayer Identifi-
cation Number(s) (TIN), and date and place of birth;
n  in the case of entities as account holders: name, ad-
dress, jurisdiction(s) of residence and TIN(s) of the 
entity as well as the name, address, jurisdiction(s) of 
residence, TIN(s), and date and place of birth of the 
controlling persons;
n  account number;
n  name and identifying number (if any) of the reporting 
financial institution;
n  account balance or value.
It must be noted that even though the CMAATM, as well 
as the CRS MCAA implementing the Convention, are mul-
tilateral instruments, the actual exchange of information 
is still activated and conducted bilaterally between the 
competent authorities of the signatory countries, which 
commit to confidentiality, speciality,64 and reciprocity65 
57. OECD (2015).
58. See OECD, Automatic Exchange Portal, available at http://www.oecd.
org/tax/automatic-exchange/international-framework-for-the-crs/.
59. An entity that holds, as a substantial part of its business, financial 
assets for the account of others.
60. An entity that accepts deposits in the ordinary course of a banking 
or similar business.
61. An entity that primarily conducts as a business certain activities (trad-
ing in money market instruments, portfolio management, financial asset 
investment and trading) on behalf of other persons.
62. An insurance company that issues a cash value insurance contract or 
an annuity contract.
63. An account is treated as reportable if it is identified as such pur-
suant to due diligence procedures that distinguish between preexisting 
individual accounts of lower and of high value accounts; new individual 
accounts; preexisting entity accounts; and new entity accounts.
64. I. e., the exchanged information may only be used for tax purposes 
unless the submitting state explicitly agrees to a different use.
65. I. e., states can only ask for assistance with regard to taxes and in 
those forms for which they are themselves ready to give assistance.
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and file respective notifications through the OECD, which 
functions as the depository of the information.66
In recognition that certain measures of coercion may be 
needed, the G20 Finance Ministers have further request-
ed the OECD to prepare a blacklist of non-coope rative ju-
risdictions by the July 2017 G20 Summit, at which point, 
»defensive measures will be considered.«67 In order to be 
classified cooperative, the OECD has stated that coun-
tries, particularly those classified as financial centers, 
must meet at least two of the three following require-
ments: a rating of »largely compliant« by the Global Fo-
rum; a commitment to automatic exchange of informa-
tion under the common reporting standard by 2018; and 
participation in the CMAATM or a sufficient bilateral net-
work of information exchange (while the United States 
has not signed the multilateral agreement, it has a large 
set intergovernmental agreements under FATCA).
b) Country by Country Reporting
In addition to the movement toward automatic ex-
change of tax information, the G20 mandated the OECD 
to lead on reform efforts to »realign taxation with eco-
nomic substance and value creation« and tackle base 
erosion and profit-shifting (BEPS). In February 2013, the 
OECD published the report Addressing Base Erosion and 
Profit Shifting and a few months later developed an Ac-
tion Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting. In just two 
years, the OECD presented the final BEPS package to the 
G20 Finance Ministers with detailed reports on each of 
the 15 Actions and recommendations for coordinated 
reform of the international tax rules. The BEPS Project 
achieved consensus on four minimum standards which 
were endorsed by the G20: model provisions to pre-
vent tax treaty abuse; standardized Country-by-Country 
Reporting (CbCR); a re-launching of the FHTP peer re-
view process to address harmful tax practices; and an 
agreement to secure progress on tax dispute resolution 
through the so-called mutual agreement procedure. 
Country-by-country reporting (CbCR) requires countries 
to automatically exchange tax information on revenues, 
profits, taxes due/paid, employees, and assets of each 
entity. In order to implement CbCR, the OECD has devel-
66. OECD (2014).
67. G20 (2016).
oped the Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement 
on the Exchange of Country-by-Country Reports (CbC 
MCAA) as well as a standardized electronic format (CbC 
XML schema) for the exchange of CbC Reports between 
jurisdictions. As of this writing, there are 49 signatories 
to this agreement. The United States has not yet signed; 
it has yet to enact legislation requiring country-by-coun-
try reporting.68 
BEPS »Associate status« in the OECD’s Committee on 
Fiscal Affairs is being offered to all interested countries 
willing to commit to both the BEPS standards and BEPS 
implementation peer review. The »Inclusive Framework« 
approach will extend the BEPS reform measures on a 
global basis: Peer reviews on the four minimum standards, 
including CbCR, will take place by and of the members of 
the Inclusive Framework, and »relevant jurisdictions« will 
also be peer reviewed regardless of their involvement in 
the framework .
The Independent Commission on Reform of Interna-
tional Corporate Taxation (ICRICT), a group of influen-
tial economists and development leaders, issued a brief 
welcoming the BEPS work, but argued that its reform 
agenda, including the CbCR standards, does not go far 
enough, and specifically that the CbCR reporting thresh-
old should include all companies (not just those with 
over 750 million euros in revenues) and that this infor-
mation should be accessible to the public. The ICRICT 
recommendations have received strong support across 
the international community and while regulatory re-
quirements are only just emerging, some proposals for 
national CbCR laws have required public reporting.69
IV. Recommendations
As the previous Section has illustrated, global tolerance 
for secrecy is rapidly diminishing. The international com-
munity has been engaged in an extensive cost-benefit 
discussion, and whatever the benefits, they are over-
68. A newly introduced bill, the Corporate Transparency and Account-
ability Act of 2016, would require publicly-traded multinationals to dis-
close information on revenues, profits, taxes, and operations on a coun-
try-by-country basis in their reporting to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission. See H.R. 6126 of 22 September 2016. The bill has now 
received widespread support, including from the financial industry, but 
continues to be strongly opposed by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. 
See Dougherty (2016); Pearl (2016).
69. L.225-102-4 du code de commerce, France.
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shadowed by the costs. In the early days of the fight 
against secrecy, attention was focused on banks and the 
financial sector more broadly. But the Panama Papers 
illustrated that if we are to address the problems posed 
by secrecy-havens, we have to do something about the 
underlying institutional arrangements that facilitate a 
lack of transparency, as well as the complex web of cor-
porate structures and those that help create and main-
tain them. Governments are being held accountable to 
adopt and enforce regulations that prevent opacity; and 
countries whose governments fail to do so should and 
will face serious consequences.
If the country itself will not enforce transparency reg-
ulations, then the international community should step 
in to fill the void. And it should do so in a way that en-
courages other secrecy-havens to undertake tough en-
forcement. Doing something about any particular site 
will have limited benefits, unless action is taken against 
all of the sites.
This world has changed in the last quarter century. Not 
only has globalization proceeded apace, so has the dark-
er side of globalization—facilitated by secrecy-havens. 
And as this has occurred, the global community has 
rightly recognized this as a disease that has to be at-
tacked globally. Politicians in secrecy-havens may have 
insufficient incentives for tough enforcement, as those 
within their countries who benefit from secrecy often 
have undue political influence. Fortunately, politicians 
within much of the rest of the global community have 
strong incentives to ensure strict enforcement as it is 
they, their citizens, and their treasuries, which suffer 
from the illicit activities that flourish under secrecy. 
As economic leaders, the United States and Europe 
have an obligation to force financial centers to comply 
with global transparency standards. That they have the 
instruments to do so has been forcefully shown in the 
fight against terrorism. That they do not do so in the 
fight against corruption and tax avoidance and evasion 
is testimony to the power of the interests of those who 
benefit from secrecy.
While countries like the United Kingdom and the United 
States preach about the vices of the offshore centers, 
within their own borders there are pockets of secrecy 
where these bad practices continue. But with the overall 
societal costs so transparently large, there is a growing 
demand among the public to end this state of affairs. 
Therefore, U.S. and European regulators should treat 
secrecy-havens like the carriers of a dangerous disease. 
If left unchecked, it can spread like a virulent virus. We 
know what to do with dangerous contagious diseases: 
quarantine. And so too for the secrecy-havens: they 
should be cut off from the global financial and economic 
system and we have the necessary means at hand: 
n   We can declare it illegal for any citizen of the »coop-
erative« countries to have an account in a non-coop-
erative jurisdiction.
n  We can declare it illegal for an individual or a corpo-
ration in a cooperative country to be a shareholder, 
director, or trustee of any trust, corporation, or foun-
dation in a non-cooperative country. 
n  We can declare it illegal for any bank to have any 
correspondence relationship or to interact in any way 
with any financial institution in a non-cooperative ju-
risdiction. 
And the punishment for the violation of these laws 
should be severe. A bank or other financial institution vi-
olating these principles should lose its license to operate; 
a lawyer or other professional service provider violating 
these principles should lose their license to practice; a 
publicly created entity failing to report its tax and benefi-
cial ownership information annually should be de-listed. 
The fact is that there is an ample supply of good actors; 
the international community does not need to encour-
age the bad actors.
Much is at stake: if we cannot show our citizens that 
globalization can be tempered, that it can be tamed for 
the benefit of the vast majority, there will be a backlash. 
And the first order of business in taming globalization 
is to make sure that the secrecy-havens are shut down. 
If we cannot do that, how can we expect our citizens 
to believe that we are able—or willing—to temper glo-
balization.
Most of the recommendations laid out below are aimed 
at the international community. But there is also one 
overriding recommendation aimed at the secrecy-ha-
vens: Rules and regulations that might have been un-
thinkable twenty-five years ago are now viewed as just 
the beginning. It is vital for all countries, and especially 
small countries with significant financial centers, to stay 
ahead of the curve by creating a business model for long 
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term sustainable growth. They cannot continue with a 
business model based on taking advantage of gaps in 
global legal and regulatory standards. They cannot con-
tinue with a business model attempting to engage in 
»transparency arbitrage.« The consequences of being cut 
off from the benefits of globalization, especially in the fi-
nancial sector, would be devastating for these countries.
Countries should position themselves proactively—not 
just complying with current minimal standards, but plac-
ing their economic development model at the cutting 
edge of the evolution of those standards. Each country 
must seriously consider whether it wants to be engaged 
in a never-ending struggle to catch up to the evolving 
international standards, or serve as a model, setting 
standards that others will eventually be forced to em-
ulate. Better today to seek an economy suited to the 
realities of tomorrow. 
This section is divided into two parts: the first lays out 
a set of broad principles, which are described in greater 
detail in the second. We need to emphasize, however, 
that it is not the intention of this Report to present con-
crete legislative proposals, but rather to show the mag-
nitude of the task before the international community, 
and to argue that the international community needs 
to take a comprehensive approach, going well beyond 
those embodied in standard practices today.
1) Principles
1.  Secrecy has to be attacked globally—offshore and 
onshore. There can be no places to hide.
2.  The collection and exchange of information related 
to taxation, ownership, and illicit activities is a shared 
global responsibility.
3.  While the traditional gatekeepers of this information 
are financial institutions, addressing secrecy effec-
tively will mean tackling the entire industry that fa-
cilitates secrecy—including the legal firms that have 
played a pivotal role in the creation of the web of 
corporations.
4.  Knowledge of beneficial ownership of companies 
and bank accounts is fundamental, both to ensure 
taxation and also to prevent and prosecute crime.
5.  Tax preferences are a privilege and not a right. Tax 
free zones provide opportunities for money launder-
ing, and those operating in such zones should be 
held to a high standard.
6.  Corporations, trusts, and foundations are creations 
of the state—and as such, they have no inalienable 
rights. They are created to facilitate societal welfare, 
and to ensure that they do so, they need to be glob-
ally regulated—regulated in ways which ensure full 
knowledge of beneficial ownership and full compli-
ance with all tax laws.
7.  Complexity contributes to lack of transparency. 
Those seeking secrecy understand this, and create 
complex webs of corporations and trusts, to make 
it more difficult for enforcement agencies to trace 
flows of illicit funds and to identify the true bene-
ficiaries of illicit activities. This has two implications: 
(a) The international community should do what 
it can to impede the creation and maintenance of 
these complex webs; and (b) to effectively fight 
for transparency—to detect true beneficial owner-
ship—requires resources beyond those available to 
enforcement agencies. 
8.  Transparency is a global public good, requiring glob-
al efforts. To facilitate these efforts, every country 
must maintain publicly searchable registries of the 
beneficial owners of each corporation, trust, foun-
dation, or other entity.
9.  Financial centers (both onshore and offshore) are cre-
ations of globalization—and should not be allowed 
to engage in regulatory and tax arbitrage. Doing so 
undermines the positive effects of globalization. If 
secrecy-havens serve as centers for tax avoidance 
and evasion or in any way facilitate corruption or illic-
it activities, they are acting as parasites, and should 
be cut off from the global financial community.
10. What matters is not just passing laws and regula-
tions, but enforcement. There is urgency: even if 
the »first best« framework cannot be immediately 
achieved, there are intermediate steps that can and 
should be taken. Throughout this Report, we have 
come down solidly on the side of »tough« sanctions, 
simply because there are many strong incentives for 
laxity. Those who benefit from secrecy and lax en-
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forcement of the regulations designed to promote 
transparency will put pressure on governments not 
to enforce these regulations. The pressure is asym-
metric: though societal benefits from transparency 
may be huge, there is no natural lobby group for 
transparency, and especially no lobby group with the 
resources of those lobbying for lax enforcement.
The following recommendations are offered against this 
backdrop.
2) Recommendations
a) Inclusive International Cooperation on 
Standard Setting and Implementation
All countries, and especially developing ones, should 
participate in all relevant multilateral fora where interna-
tional tax and transparency norms are set and in doing 
so, should be active advocates of high standards and 
demonstrate a willingness to adopt higher standards of 
transparency and to work to see that they are uniformly 
applied. And these fora should be open to all countries. 
Even exclusive governing bodies, such as the G20, are 
coming to understand that they can no longer legitimate-
ly exclude developing countries. The pressure to contin-
ue this process should remain strong until all stakehold-
ers have an equal vote in decision-making processes as 
well as equal representation in the bureaucracies which 
support these fora. Developing countries, in particular, 
should insert themselves as equal participants in these 
discussions, and fight for inclusion in not only imple-
mentation and enforcement, but also standard-setting. 
All opportunities for multilateral engagement should be 
leveraged to build resources and collectively negotiate 
standards which reflect their national and development 
priorities—but those development strategies should not 
be based on tax and regulatory arbitrage.
b) Identification of Beneficial Owners 
and Public Registries
As indicated above, identifying beneficial owners of ac-
counts and of corporations is key both to enabling au-
tomatic information exchange and to preventing money 
laundering. Creating searchable registers is already the 
common standard under the FATF Recommendations 
and the CRS, even if the detail needs further work in 
international fora. It is crucial, in our view, however, to 
progress to publicly searchable registries.
Key to stopping illicit activities is tracing money flows—
and as we have noted in Section II, one of the reasons 
that those engaged in illicit activities create complex 
webs of corporations and trusts is precisely to block the 
tracing of money flows. If one knew where the money 
that was stolen by some dictator was hidden away, one 
could potentially recover it, and hold accountable those 
who facilitated the corruption. And reducing the returns 
to illicit activities will almost surely reduce the extent of 
such illicit activity. 
National governments should establish registries of the 
names of directors, registered agents, and beneficial 
owners for all entities incorporated in the country and 
for all trusts and foundations established within the 
country. Those taking advantage of the web of corpora-
tions to hide illicit activities know that both the resources 
of enforcement agencies and their commitment to full 
transparency are limited. Whether government agencies 
could have processed the mass of information involved 
in either LuxLeaks or Panama Papers may be debated. 
Clearly, when they have wanted to, intelligence agencies 
have processed much larger amounts of data. What is 
clear is that they have not chosen to do so, or if they 
have, they have not made the findings public, perhaps 
because of the embarrassment to government and es-
tablishment figures around the world. Open registers 
allow civil society and media to participate in verifying 
the adequacy of the information given. Therefore the 
ultimate goal on identification of beneficial ownership 
should be to establish meaningful public registers of cor-
porate entities naming the beneficiaries (at least above a 
certain threshold).
c) Automatic Exchange of Tax Information
Country-by-country tax information involving registries 
of beneficial owners should be the basis of the automat-
ic exchange of information between tax authorities and 
other relevant government regulatory and enforcement 
authorities. The current international agreement imple-
menting this exchange is the Multilateral Convention 
on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters and 
agreements under Article 6 of that Convention. 
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All countries should play an active role in implement-
ing these agreements in domestic law and strengthen-
ing domestic institutions for enforcement. Developed 
countries should play a supporting capacity building role 
and begin by sharing information on a non-reciprocal 
basis with developing countries involved in programs to 
strengthen their capacity to receive, interpret, and safe-
guard such information. 
On the other hand, it is not the duty of any country to 
determine a foreigner’s home income tax obligations. 
Each country should be responsible for monitoring eco-
nomic activities that occur within their jurisdiction. If 
country A cannot tell what economic activity has oc-
curred within its own boundaries, why should we ex-
pect any other country to be able to do so? Of course, 
to ascertain the full import of cross-border activities 
(e. g. a company in country A may claim to be paying 
interest to someone in country B) may require coopera-
tion with other countries. And it may be important for 
country A to know who the beneficial owners of some 
company or trust in country B are—they may in fact 
be citizens or residents of country A—and, country B 
should be able (and obligated) to provide the informa-
tion to the home country.
d) Information Gathering, Disclosure, 
and Verification
Information can only be exchanged if it is collected. Fail-
ure to collect such information at the domestic level is 
unacceptable. Here are some of the ways that sec recy-
havens can improve their information gathering capaci-
ties and performance:
In order to penetrate the web of corporations, trusts, 
and foundations, one decisive step could be to clean out 
the web, eliminating zombie entities. To do this, cor-
porations and other legal entities, such as trusts, foun-
dations, etc., should pay a fee and file a report on an 
annual basis. In addition to the benefits of information 
collection and risk assessment, annual reports and fees 
reduce the number of »dead« corporations, which can 
be used as distraction in investigations.70 The annual 
report should include identities of beneficial owners, in 
70. By the same token, any trust or foundation should be required to be 
registered, with a declaration of the beneficial owner(s) and beneficiaries 
of the trust or foundation and those having effective control.
addition to contingent or potential beneficiaries.71 The 
annual report should state all jurisdictions in which the 
entity has carried on economic activities over the past 
year, and include the tax returns filed with each juris-
diction in which it has operated. If it has operated but 
filed no tax return in a particular jurisdiction, it should 
file an affidavit that it is not subject to taxation in that 
jurisdiction.
In its annual filing, any corporation, trust, or foundation 
incorporated in the country should be required to dis-
close the location of its economic activities; its assets, 
employees and profits within each jurisdiction in which 
it operates as well as the taxes it pays in that jurisdic-
tion. Tax returns should be signed off by a senior cor-
porate / foundation officer or settler of a trust72 as well 
as an external certified public accountant attesting to 
the accuracy of the tax filing. In addition, the annual re-
port should have a signed affidavit from the directors 
listing the beneficial owners. In the case of trusts, the 
trustees and settlers should sign an affidavit listing the 
beneficiaries, including contingent and potential ones. 
In all cases, there should be certification that they have 
personal knowledge of the ultimate beneficial owners /
beneficiaries.73
e) Supervision of Intermediaries
In addition to supervision of banks and business enti-
ties, a state must also adequately supervise intermediary 
service providers, such as the legal industry. We have 
already noted one basic obligation of a lawyer or any li-
censed agent registering a corporation or other business 
entity: to attest to personal knowledge of the ultimate 
beneficial owners. In addition, the lawyer should have 
a positive obligation to ensure that there is a genuine 
71. For instance, in some trusts, the beneficiary is A, but if A dies, then B 
becomes the beneficiary. Trustees, settlers and all other relevant persons 
referred to in the trust documents should also be identified.
72. A settler of a trust is the person who settles or donates property 
under the trust to another person, called a beneficiary.
73. The annual report should also state whether there has been any 
change in the activities in which the entity has been engaged in, or any 
change in directors, nominees, or other relevant individuals with an af-
fidavit that the change has been conducted according to the by-laws 
of the entity, and that the new directors or nominees are fully aware of 
the natural person(s) who are ultimate beneficiaries. Additionally if there 
have been any change in the beneficiaries or trustees of a trust, those 
changes should be reported along with any payments made in respect to 
those changes, and include a certification that all taxes on such transfers 
have been duly paid.
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economic motive for the existence of the company, and 
should be required to state that purpose, along with the 
intended location of the planned economic activity in 
the filing of incorporation. It will be noted that lawyers 
acting as financial intermediaries, fiduciaries, and com-
pany incorporators outside the traditional field of legal 
work do not—according to international standards—en-
joy legal privilege. Any lawyer, registered agent, or oth-
er actor who knowingly registers a corporation or trust 
whose primary purpose is to evade or avoid taxes or to 
engage in money laundering should be subject to sus-
pension, and in the case of multiple offenses, revocation 
of his / her license to practice law. Registered agents not 
complying with tax and financial information reporting 
provisions above should also be subject to adequate 
sanctions. 
f) Real Estate Transactions
Real estate has provided a convenient way for facilitat-
ing secrecy and money laundering. Recent news cov-
erage of cash purchases of luxury apartments in New 
York City and London suggests that perhaps a majority 
are owned by entities in secrecy-havens.74 The United 
States has belatedly responded by requiring disclosure 
of beneficial ownership for real estate cash transactions 
in certain locations.75 Such disclosure should be made 
mandatory—and enforced—for all large real estate 
cash transactions, and the countries in which the corpo-
rations, trusts, etc. are incorporated should require filing 
of all real estate related cash transactions. In addition, 
the Criminal Finances Bill recently introduced in the UK 
House of Commons introduces the concept of »unex-
plained wealth orders.« These orders will allow agen-
cies tracking financial transactions to force the owner 
of an asset to explain how they obtained the funds to 
purchase it. Unexplained wealth orders would also help 
reveal the owners of real estate.76 This two-sided ap-
proach may succeed in making headway against the 
use of real estate for money laundering and other illicit 
activities.
74. See Story (2016). Land Registry figures show UK real estate worth 
more than 170 billion pounds is held by more than 30,000 tax haven 
companies. See Garside (2016).
75. See U.S. Department of the Treasury (2016).
76. See U.K. Parliament, Parliament Business, Criminal Finances Bill 
2016–17, available at http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2016-17/crimi-
nalfinances.html.
The FATF toughened up AML standards regarding cash 
transactions in 2012. Regarding taxation, it should be the 
obligation of any lawyer, real estate agent, or broker to 
report all cash purchases of real estate to tax authorities, 
listing the amount of the purchase and the name of the 
beneficial owners of the purchasing entity. Of course, 
most countries have (or should have) national property 
registries, with registration required to enforce property 
rights. Full and public disclosure of the beneficial owners 
should be a condition for registering ownership.
We have already discussed the obligations imposed on 
lawyers conducting these and similar transactions. Sim-
ilarly, any systematic pattern of violations within a legal 
or brokerage firm should be punished by suspension or 
permanent revocation of the license of all the lawyers 
and/or agents within these firms. It is the responsibility 
of all professionals within the firm to ensure that part-
ners and associates and/or brokers and agents are not 
engaged in such activities. Again, the resources available 
to the government for monitoring are limited. Partners 
can be an important part of the monitoring process.
g) Responsibilities of Corporate Fiduciaries
Today, a single agent may »represent« hundreds if not 
thousands of corporations. In many countries, there are 
no limits to the number of boards of directors in which 
a person may participate, and it may be common for the 
members of the board of directors to have no real con-
nection to or with the operations or ownership of the 
company. Therefore, it would not be unusual to find jan-
itors, secretaries, or drivers of a law firm listed as mem-
bers of the board of directors of a company served by 
the same law firm which employs them. It should be ob-
vious that it is almost impossible for any single agent—
and especially one without adequate support staff—to 
fulfill his or her responsibilities, assuming of course the 
entity is a real entity.
Thus, nominee directors, or even officers, should only 
be allowed to serve on a limited number of boards or 
management positions, as it is impossible to adequate-
ly fulfill fiduciary obligations to a multitude of interests. 
Performance of duties of care and loyalty implicated in 
fiduciary relationships undertaken by directors, officers, 
and managers becomes inadequate when engagement 
is unduly limited.
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h) Institutional Capacity, Implementation, 
and Enforcement
Another foundational requirement concerns institution-
al capacity. All regulatory institutions which administer 
the exchange of information and supervise financial in-
stitutions and associated service providers (accountants, 
registered agents, attorneys, etc.) must have suitable 
personnel meeting the highest professional standards, 
and must also have adequate independence and budg-
etary resources to carry out their duties. And it is es-
pecially important to ensure that there are no conflicts 
of interests affecting government employees and public 
officials tasked with oversight.77
Some secrecy-havens have responded to the demand 
for more transparency by merely passing laws, which 
are modeled after other seemingly respectable jurisdic-
tions. Yet, some of these jurisdictions, even if they are 
»onshore,« are themselves secrecy-havens. The thrust 
of this report is that we have to curb secrecy-havens, 
whether they are on- or offshore, and it is not a de-
fense to say that the legal framework is no worse than 
that of other jurisdictions. Furthermore, one should 
always be careful about »legal transplants.« Even sim-
ilar laws can have quite different consequences under 
different legal systems. Finally, and perhaps most im-
portantly, what matters is not just passing laws, but 
enforcing them.
Modelling one country’s laws after another is not suffi-
cient by itself, but must be complemented by a strong 
and impartial judiciary and regulatory institutions to 
administer and enforce the law. Such laws must also 
fit within the context of the country’s legal system as 
a whole, as other laws may be needed to complement 
or support laws enacted to promote transparency—and 
other laws may have to be repealed. Further, the im-
pact and interaction of laws should be monitored to de-
termine necessary amendments. For instance, in some 
countries it is illegal to disclose information that is sup-
posed to be secret—even if that disclosure itself would 
enable the enforcement of anti-corruption laws. 
77. Such conflicts of interest may be reduced through the following 
disclosures before hiring/elections: (1) Disclosure of beneficial owner of 
any entity, foreign or domestic, especially non-transparent companies, 
trusts, and/or foundations; (2) Disclosure of any financial support and /
or campaign contribution from any participant in the financial services 
sector; (3) Disclosure of previous professional employment and / or board 
membership of the industries being regulated.
There is also the need to address circumvention of the 
intent of regulations, and anti-abuse provisions in legisla-
tion can go a long way in providing the means for regu-
latory authorities to circumscribe such circumvention. For 
example, attestation clauses and »know your client« ob-
ligations must require direct and personal knowledge.78
i) Whistleblower Protection
Finally, all countries should have strong whistleblower pro-
tections for public and private employees in regulated sec-
tors.79 Instead of being protected, however, whistleblow-
ers are often prosecuted: former PwC employee Antoine 
Deltoure is now appealing a one-year prison sentence and 
a 1,500 euros fine for leaking secret tax rulings made by 
Luxembourg, which enabled over 340 companies to set 
up complex company structures to avoid corporate income 
tax globally. Whistleblowers have not only exposed mas-
sive tax avoidance by respected global corporations, but 
have also exposed the identities of individual owners of 
hundreds of thousands of shell companies, foundations, 
and trusts set up through thousands of intermediaries all 
over the world to evade taxes, launder money, and hide 
wealth. »If You See Something, Say Something« should 
not just be reserved for public security, but should apply 
to all cases of secrecy where the public interest is at stake.
j) Freedom of Information Act
A strong Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) is at the 
heart of transparency and citizen engagement. The gate-
keeper of enforcement is the judiciary, and judges pos-
sess the power to block or inordinately delay release of in-
formation, or authorise heavy redaction. Therefore, FOIA 
legislation should include clear criteria for release of infor-
mation with limited and time-bound judicial discretion.
k) Review Processes
The global economy is dynamic and evolving, as are 
global standards. The private sector is innovative in cre-
ating new ways to obfuscate and prevent transparency. 
78. See, e. g., US Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C. 1051 et seq. and regula-
tions under 31 C.F.R. 1020.220, 1023.220, 1024.220, and 1026.220.
79. See Wolfe, et al. (2014).
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Therefore constant monitoring of the implementation of 
international and domestic standards is crucial. This can 
be done in different ways. 
According to one approach, a government may establish 
an Independent Standards Review Commission to review 
both legislation and enforcement, to ascertain whether 
there are gaps between country practices and global best 
practices and norms. Membership should be structured to 
avoid potential conflicts of interest and, to assure independ-
ence from local pressure groups, should be comprised of a 
mix of in-country and out-of-country experts. An annual 
public report should identify gaps between international 
standards and current legislation, and gaps between what 
the international standards are likely to be in the coming 
years and current legislation. In the area of enforcement, 
the Commission should review the structure, resources, 
and performance of all relevant regulatory bodies.
The Standards Review Commission should also be com-
plemented by an Independent Resources Review Com-
mission, again composed of a mix of in-country and out-
of-country experts, vetted for conflicts of interest. The 
Independent Resources Commission should provide an 
annual public assessment of gaps in skills and other re-
sources impeding effective regulation, supervision, and 
enforcement, with a particular focus on institutions of 
higher education training professionals in legal, account-
ing, and auditing affairs; and propose a timeline of ac-
tions to address and remedy these resource deficiencies.
Country reviews by international organizations could 
also be intensified with input by NGOs and academia 
worldwide.
l) Tax Preferences
As discussed in Part II of this Report, tax preferences, in 
the form of exemptions and incentives targeted to at-
tract foreign investment, not only bring limited benefits 
in terms of promotion of long term sustainable growth, 
they also place domestic firms at a competitive disadvan-
tage. More perniciously, tax preferences also combine 
with secrecy to enable and encourage tax avoidance 
and evasion on a massive scale, and in many instances 
play a role in attracting money laundering operations. 
Tax exemptions and incentives on profits from activities 
within special economic zones should be subject to tight 
scrutiny, establishing whether the profits booked within 
those zones are commensurate with the level of actual 
economic activities that have occurred, as indicated by 
employment and capital. 
Furthermore, companies receiving tax exemptions and 
incentives should receive them only where they are not 
used to shift recorded profits from other jurisdictions: 
the incentive to claim that profits have been earned 
in a low tax jurisdiction, even when they have not, is 
too tempting for many firms to resist. Any firm that has 
been found to have engaged in systematic profit shift-
ing (whether associated with money laundering or not) 
should lose the benefits of its tax preference, and such 
loss of tax preference should be extended to any firm, 
trust, or foundation with substantial overlap of benefi-
cial ownership or directorship. Additionally, no tax pref-
erences should be extended to any firm whose beneficial 
owner has been associated with money laundering or 
previously convicted of tax evasion.
In this regard, an Independent Tax Review Commission 
should evaluate whether the social and economic bene-
fits of tax preferences (for example, in terms of job cre-
ation and indirect tax revenues generated through the 
activities stimulated) are worth the costs (for example, 
through diversion of domestic economic activity; the as-
sociated loss of tax revenues; and exposure of the coun-
try to the risks of association with tax avoidance, evasion, 
and money laundering). This Review Commission should 
publish all tax preferences as budget expenditures in an 
annual public report along with the social and economic 
benefits from such preferences. 
3) Exceptions
As we engaged in discussions with those in secrecy-ha-
vens over the costs and benefits of secrecy, the defences 
of personal security, the individual’s right of privacy, and 
commercial confidentiality protections were repeatedly 
asserted. First of all, these concerns have been exagger-
ated and there are means by which these »exceptions« 
can be handled. 
In regard to personal security, one of the arguments put 
forward is that lifting secrecy will divulge details con-
cerning wealth, making individuals prey to kidnapping. 
But an individual’s lifestyle is a far more significant signal 
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concerning their wealth: living in a multimillion dollar 
home signals that an individual is very well off.
Moreover, an individual’s right to privacy is not absolute 
and must defer when basic human rights are compro-
mised by a global secrecy network that enables human 
trafficking, government corruption, and the financing of 
terrorism. Indeed, in some cases, secrecy has itself un-
dermined national security.80
In regard to commercial privacy, corporations may argue 
that such transparency violates their basic rights, but as 
mentioned in Principle #6, corporations have no inalienable 
rights. They are not automatically endowed with human 
rights as individuals are. Corporations are creations of the 
state, and as such, the state has the right to endow them 
with whatever rights and responsibilities it believes serves 
societal interests, such as limited liability, patent protec-
tions, etc., and in each case, there is a cost benefit analysis. 
It is also important to note that none of the arguments 
for secrecy hold up in the case of disclosure to regulatory 
and law enforcement authorities. One of the specious 
arguments put forward is that disclosure to certain gov-
ernments will lead to leakage; but a condition for the 
automatic exchange of information is that the agencies 
with whom the information is being exchanged have the 
capacity to keep the information confidential.
Finally, the global community has the right to impose 
restrictions on any country seeking to participate in the 
benefits of financial globalization—if what they do has 
adverse effects on other countries. Secrecy imposes 
harm on the entire global community. Thus, each coun-
try, and the global community, has both the right and 
the obligation to curtail secrecy. The recommendations 
in this section, and elsewhere in this report, are all made 
with these perspectives in mind.
V. What Is at Stake in the Fight 
Against Secrecy?
This Report has discussed why secrecy has such an ad-
verse effect and what can be done to shut down tax 
and secrecy-havens around the world. In these conclud-
ing remarks, we seek to put this Report into a broader 
80. See supra note 7.
perspective of the ongoing debate about globalization. 
There is obviously a great deal of discontent with glo-
balization, not only in developing countries, but also 
increasingly in developed ones. It has become increas-
ingly clear that while there may have been benefits to 
economic growth from globalization, at least in many 
countries, distributive effects have outweighed growth 
effects for large segments of the population: there are 
many individuals who see themselves not just relatively 
worse off, but absolutely so. 
While the benefits of globalization have been multi-fac-
eted, including moving more than half a billion people 
out of poverty during the past half century and the glob-
al spread of ideas and values such as human rights, it 
is also clear that globalization has had its darker side: 
just as good things move more easily across borders, so 
do bad things—like terrorism. Additionally, globalization 
has not only contributed to the growth of inequality, it 
has actually impaired the ability of governments to ad-
dress it: those who seek to avoid declaring ownership or 
paying their fair share of taxes can more easily move to 
some jurisdiction to hide their wealth or avoid taxation.
This Report and reports by the Independent Commis-
sion on the Reform of International Corporate Taxa-
tion (ICRICT) have highlighted two of the more unsa-
voury aspects of globalization. The ICRICT Declaration 
showed how transfer pricing in the existing corporate 
tax system provides an easy framework within which 
multinationals can avoid taxation, and fuels a race to 
the bottom as different countries compete to attract 
business not in a positive and healthy way—by, for in-
stance, providing a more educated labour force, better 
infrastructure, or a superior legal framework—but rath-
er by lowering taxes. 
Unfortunately, irresponsible governments have shown a 
willingness to avail themselves of this framework; coun-
tries like Ireland showed that for a pittance—a small in-
crease in incorporation fees and a few jobs—they were 
willing to rob their so-called EU partners of billions of 
euros in tax revenues. Many Irish citizens found the 
stance of their government morally repugnant and many 
of Apple’s shareholders rightly understand that the most 
important aspect of corporate responsibility is paying 
your fair share of taxes. While there may be disagree-
ments about what that fair share is, Apple’s effective tax 
rate of 0.005 percent crossed the moral boundary. 
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This Report focuses on something even more corrosive 
of the global community: the secrecy-havens, which 
provide ample opportunity not just for facilitating tax 
avoidance and evasion, but also money laundering—
thus facilitating all manner of corruption and socially 
destructive and morally repugnant activities. 
These negative impacts of globalization qualitatively 
differ from other oft-criticized aspects, like trade and 
financial globalization: there is no benefit to offset the 
immense social costs. In a global community, the secre-
cy-havens have provided a place for bad actors to hide 
both their illegal activity and their money from detec-
tion. Of course, we know that these activities are going 
on. But if we are to stop them, we have to know who 
is doing what, and we have to take away the huge fi-
nancial incentives for those engaging in them. The se-
crecy-havens enable criminals to enjoy the fruits of their 
bad behaviour and thus, continue all the more. And the 
secrecy-havens make it virtually impossible to penetrate 
the web of bad actors. When we find out who is the 
owner of a bank account into which illicit funds have 
been deposited, it turns out to be a company incorporat-
ed in another secrecy haven, and law enforcement and 
investigative journalists alike face a dead end. 
A major lesson emerges: in our global economy, trans-
parency is only as strong as the weakest link—as the 
least transparent member of the global community. 
There are two major implications: Secrecy has to be 
tackled globally and there has to be zero tolerance for 
any deviation from the established global norms.
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